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The bulk of recent literature on foreign exchange interventions has overlooked the 
potential interdependencies that may exist between these operations and the conduct of 
monetary policy. This is the case even under inflation targeting and especially in 
emerging-market economies, because central banks often explicitly reserve the right to 
intervene to calm disorderly markets and to accumulate foreign reserves, and when the 
exchange rate is perceived as being out of step with fundamentals. This paper uses a 
friction model to estimate intervention reaction functions and the associated marginal 
effects for Brazil and the Czech Republic since the adoption of inflation targeting in 
these countries in 1999 and 1998, respectively. The main findings are that: (i) in both 
countries interventions occur predominantly to reduce exchange rate volatility, while in  
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Brazil the central bank also reacts to exchange rate deviations from medium-term 
trends; (ii) there are strong, asymmetric threshold effects in the reaction functions, and 
interventions are more likely and of higher magnitudes when they are carried out to 
depreciate than to appreciate the domestic currency; and (iii) interventions seem to take 
place independently of contemporaneous monetary policy in Brazil, but not in the 
Czech Republic, where both policies appear to be interrelated. 
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The bulk of recent literature on foreign exchange interventions has overlooked the 
potential interdependencies that may exist between these operations and the conduct of 
monetary policy. Because price stability is the overriding policy objective in a monetary 
regime combining inflation targeting with a floating exchange rate, the central bank is 
assumed not to use foreign exchange interventions as a policy tool in pursuit of an 
independent policy goal. Nevertheless, inflation-targeting central banks often explicitly 
reserve the right to intervene in the foreign exchange market—by selling or purchasing 
foreign currency in the spot market with the aim of influencing currency parities—when 
the exchange rate ‘deviates from fundamentals’ and/or ‘displays excessive volatility’.1 
The problem is that the conditions under which foreign exchange interventions are 
allowed are difficult to define and communicate. Market participants may therefore 
perceive interventions as an attempt by the central bank to target a specific level of the 
exchange rate, which would create interdependencies between interventions and 
monetary policy.  
It has also been argued that the ‘benign neglect’ of exchange rate developments by the 
central bank when setting monetary policy is a particularly strong assumption in the 
context of emerging market economies. This is because these economies typically suffer 
from sizeable currency mismatches in debt portfolios, which aggravate the balance sheet 
effects of exchange rate fluctuations. Also, central banks may lack de facto operational 
autonomy, and the pass-through of exchange rate changes to prices tends to be higher 
than in more mature economies. In such an environment, monetary policy itself may be 
responsive to exchange rate developments, which creates a potential simultaneity 
between intervention and monetary policies. This hypothesis has so far been tested 
empirically by including the exchange rate in Taylor rule-type monetary reaction 
functions (e.g., Mohanty and Klau 2005; de Mello and Moccero 2006). 
Another argument for shedding further light on interdependencies between interventions 
and monetary policy is the fact that interventions may convey information about future 
monetary stance. For example, interventions may signal a perception that the exchange 
rate is misaligned, which might subsequently trigger a change in the monetary stance. 
On the other hand, the monetary stance itself may be a good predictor of interventions. 
Establishing the direction of causality is essentially an empirical question. Evidence 
based on temporal causality tests tends to favour the hypothesis that interventions signal 
monetary policy moves, at least for the United States (Lewis 1995; Kaminsky and 
Lewis 1996; Fatum and Hutchison 1999). Recent empirical evidence for emerging 
markets has focused some attention on testing for inconsistencies between interventions 
and monetary policymaking under inflation targeting, at least as far as the Czech 
Republic is concerned (Holub 2004; Gersl and Holub 2006). This is the case, for 
example, when the central bank purchases foreign currency while tightening monetary 
policy. 
Against this background, the empirical analysis reported in this paper focuses on the 
experiences of Brazil and the Czech Republic. Both countries abandoned exchange rate 
targeting (although the Czech Republic maintains a managed float) and have pursued 
                                                 
1  See Moser-Boehm (2005) for cross-country information on the institutional settings for monetary, 
exchange rate and intervention policies.  
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monetary policy within an inflation-targeting framework since 1998-99, while 
periodically intervening in the foreign exchange market. Information is therefore 
available for a long enough timespan at the monthly frequency, which is more 
appropriate for capturing changes in the monetary stance than the higher frequencies 
(i.e., daily or intraday) at which the effects of intervention on the exchange rate are 
conventionally tested. A distinctive feature of both the Brazilian and Czech experiences, 
as well as other emerging-market economies, is that both interventions and monetary 
policymaking are under the purview of the central bank. This makes a clear distinction 
with respect to several more mature economies, where monetary policy is 
conventionally decided by the central bank and exchange rate policy by the ministry of 
finance (Humpage 2003), although it is still implemented by the central bank in the 
latter case. This distinction in institutional settings is important, because it may increase 
the scope for interdependencies between interventions and the conduct of monetary 
policy. It may also facilitate policy coordination: if interventions and monetary policy 
are coordinated, purchases of foreign currency should be accompanied by interest rate 
cuts and vice versa. 
Our empirical contribution is two-fold. First,  we use a friction model to estimate 
intervention reaction functions for Brazil and the Czech Republic. In friction models, 
the dependent variable is insensitive to its determinants over a range of values (Neely 
2005). This is an appealing feature of the model, because the intervention series are 
discontinuous (i.e., there often are long spells of no intervention). The friction model 
therefore predicts zeros in periods when there is no intervention. Our model 
specifications include exchange rate volatility and deviations of the exchange rate from 
trend, as well as variables capturing the monetary stance, such as the policy interest rate. 
We use realized volatility (defined as the sum of squared daily returns within a month), 
because it is less noisy than other measures estimated from GARCH models (Andersen 
et al. 2003). We compute robust standard errors to deal with potential serial correlation 
in the disturbance terms, given the persistency of interventions, and heteroscedasticity 
in the data, because of the clustering of small and large-scale interventions around 
specific periods of time. Second, we compute the marginal effects associated with the 
estimated coefficients to discuss the presence of asymmetries that might exist in 
intervention reaction functions. This is the case, for example, when the central bank 
reacts more strongly to currency appreciations than depreciations. To our knowledge, 
this paper is the first one in the empirical literature to compute the marginal effects 
associated with intervention reaction functions estimated on the basis of a friction 
model. 
Our main empirical findings are as follows: 
–  The main motive for intervening in the spot foreign exchange market in Brazil 
and the Czech Republic appears to be to calm disorderly markets, rather than to 
target a specific level of the exchange rate. Interventions were found to be 
strongly affected by exchange rate volatility in both countries, and by exchange 
rate deviations from medium-term trends in Brazil; 
–  There appears to be strong, asymmetric threshold effects in the intervention 
reaction functions for both Brazil and the Czech Republic. The monetary 
authorities in these countries tend to react more strongly when aiming at 
depreciations than appreciations of the domestic currency; and  
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–  Interventions seem to take place independently of current monetary policy in 
Brazil, but not in the Czech Republic, where both policies appear to be 
interrelated. There is no evidence that interventions provide strong signals about 
future monetary policy moves in either country. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses possible sources of 
interdependencies between monetary and intervention policies and reviews the 
empirical literature. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy and describes the friction 
model and the data used in the econometric analysis. Section 4 summarizes the 
institutional set-up for monetary and intervention policies in Brazil and the Czech 
Republic. In Section 5 we empirically assess the determinants of interventions and 
report the corresponding marginal effects. Section 6 concludes. 
2  The literature on foreign exchange interventions 
There is a sizeable, predominantly empirical, literature on central bank interventions in 
developed countries, surveyed by Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Humpage (2003), 
among others. For emerging-market economies, the empirical literature is more recent 
and far less voluminous. By intervening in the foreign exchange market, the monetary 
authority aims to affect the exchange rate through three main channels. First,  if 
interventions are not sterilized, they alter the money supply and hence the exchange rate 
directly. In this case, interventions and the monetary stance are clearly interconnected 
Second,  when sterilized, interventions change the supply of bonds denominated in 
domestic and foreign currency. Because these securities are not perfectly substitutable, 
the exchange rate is affected by an ensuing change in portfolio composition. 
Finally, interventions may signal future monetary policy moves, even when they are 
sterilized; purchases of foreign currency should indicate an impending monetary easing, 
which also has a bearing on the exchange rate (Mussa 1981). Of course, only through 
sterilized interventions can the central bank pursue an exchange rate objective in a 
manner that is independent of monetary policy setting.  
The empirical literature focuses on the estimation of ‘intervention reaction functions’ to 
predict the timing and magnitude of interventions, as well as for testing whether or not 
the motives stated by the authorities for intervening are borne out by the data 
(Almekinders 1995; Almekinders and Eijffinger 1996; Baillie and Osterberg 1997;   
Ito and Yabu 2007; Kearns and Rigobon 2005; Bernal 2006; Beine et  al. 2008). 
Appendix 1 provides an overview of the empirical literature. Motivation comes 
essentially from the need to accurately identify the monetary authority’s policy 
objectives when intervening in the foreign exchange market, so that the effectiveness of 
such interventions can be empirically gauged. The conventional strategy is to regress 
spot-market interventions on measures of exchange rate deviation from fundamentals 
and volatility (Ito 2003), as well as controls. General functional specifications are as 
follows:  
t t t X I ε β + = , (1) 
where It denotes the magnitude of interventions at time t, Xt is a set of explanatory 
variables, and εt is an error term.  
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Empirical studies on intervention reaction functions often lack explicit theoretical 
foundations. A plausible hypothesis is that exchange rate volatility and/or 
misalignments (i.e.,  deviations from fundamentals) reduce welfare, especially when 
price-setting is affected by a risk premium associated with exchange rate uncertainty 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff 1998). Empirical evidence nevertheless suggests that these 
welfare losses are small for industrial economies, but may be large in emerging-market 
economies (Bergin 2004).2 Also, spot-market interventions are not free of bureaucratic, 
political, and financial costs (Almekinders 1995; Almekinders and Eijffinger 1996). 
These costs create threshold effects in the reaction function; therefore, central banks 
intervene only sporadically, when the benefits of interventions outweigh their associated 
cost. Therefore, in practice, interventions are discontinuous over time and tend to be 
clustered around specific periods of time.  
Although the idea of an intervention reaction function is conceptually fairly 
straightforward, the statistical distribution of intervention data, as noted above, and the 
potential endogeneity of the exchange rate level and volatility pose important 
econometric challenges. Because the dependent variable is censored, the disturbance 
terms of regressions of interventions on continuous variables are most likely not 
normally distributed. Therefore, standard linear estimators, such as ordinary least 
squares, should not be applied, since they produce inconsistent parameter estimates. 
Two estimators have been used instead: probit or ordered probit models, to estimate the 
probability of interventions (purchases or sales) or the probability of purchases and sales 
separately (Ito and Yabu 2007), and the friction model, to estimate both the occurrence 
and the magnitude of purchases and sales of foreign exchange (Neely 2006).  
In addition, current interventions tend to depend strongly on past interventions, so that 
care needs to be taken when estimating reaction functions with serially correlated errors. 
To deal with this problem, lagged interventions are often included among the regressors 
in Equation 1. Although this is fine in linear models, the statistical properties of non-
linear models with a lagged dependent variable among the regressors are not yet entirely 
known.3 Instead, robust standard errors should be computed to take account of serially 
correlated errors in non-linear models. With regard to options for dealing with 
simultaneity biases, the use of instrumental variable techniques is problematic, because 
it is difficult to find good instruments for the exchange rate that are orthogonal to the 
shocks affecting intervention.  
The problem of simultaneity has featured more prominently—although it remains by 
and large unresolved—in the literature on the effectiveness of interventions than in that 
on the estimation of intervention reaction functions. Options for dealing with the 
endogeneity of interventions in exchange rate equations include the use of high-
frequency (typically intra-day) data, which allow for restrictions on contemporaneous 
                                                 
2   This is because, as noted above, balance sheet effects due to liability dollarization are typically large 
in emerging markets, the pass-through of changes in the exchange rate to prices is also high, and there 
are limited instruments for hedging against exchange rate risk. 
3   This strategy has often been used for linear models (Ito 2003; Gersl and Holub 2006). But, for non-
linear models (Ito and Yabu 2007), the dependent variable is observed only when the latent variable is 
above a certain threshold, making the specification by far more complex. Only recently have the 
asymptotic properties of a limited number of non-linear models been explored when the lagged 
(observed, rather than latent) dependent variable is included among the regressors. See de Jong and 
Woutersen (2003) for a probit model, and de Jong and Herrera (2004) for a Tobit model.  
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effects of interventions on exchange rate movements (Dominguez 2005), and through 
different identification strategies, when the interrelations between interventions and the 
exchange rate are modelled explicitly (Neely 2005, 2006). It has been argued that 
changes in policy settings can be used for identification (Kearns and Rigobon 2005). 
The problems with these strategies are that, first, it is not easy to identify 
contemporaneous effects even when high-frequency data are used and, second, changes 
in policy highlight the problems of structural breaks in the intervention reaction function 
and, therefore, parameter instability. In this regard, it can be argued that changes in 
policy reduce the scope for interventions to convey information about future policy 
moves, which is one of the channels through which sterilized interventions are expected 
to affect the exchange rate. An alternative strategy for dealing with simultaneity is to 
use event studies (Fatum and Hutchison 2006). Accordingly, a success criterion is 
defined a priori and the frequency of success is computed over a pre-determined period 
of time. 
3  The estimation strategy 
3.1  The friction model 
Our dataset contains information on both the date of occurrence and the magnitude of 
interventions. The friction model is preferred to the (ordered) probit and Tobit 
estimators, because it allows for all the information available on interventions to be 
fully used: probit models do not to take the magnitude (only the timing) of interventions 
into account, while the Tobit specification assumes perfect symmetry in interventions 
on both sides of the market. The friction model is a censored dependent-variable model 
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t I  is the desired level of intervention in period t, ) , , ( 3 2 1 t t t t X X X X =  is a set of 
explanatory variables capturing the exchange rate dynamics, factors related to monetary 
policymaking and a set of controls, It is the actual level of intervention,  ) , 0 ( ~
2 σ ε N t  is 
an error term,  1 0 Θ > , and  2 0 Θ < . 
The basic intuition of the model is that, due to the costs associated with interventions 
(discussed above), the central bank only sells or purchases foreign exchange when there 
is a significant change in exogenous conditions. These costs are explicitly captured by 
1 Θ  and  2 Θ , which are the intervention thresholds. Figure 1 illustrates this mechanism: 
the central bank intervenes only if the optimal level of intervention is below  1 Θ  or 
above  2 Θ .  
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The product is computed over three sets of observations for which  1
* Θ < t I  (set 1), 
2
*
1 Θ ≤ ≤ Θ t I  (set 2), and 
*
2 t I < Θ  (set 3). In addition, φ  refers to the standard normal 
density, and Φ is the cumulative normal distribution.4  
The interpretation of the estimated coefficients is nevertheless less trivial than in a 
linear setting. In a friction model, the estimated coefficients of a regression, such as 
Equation 1, refer to the desired (It
*), rather than actual (It), amount of intervention. 
Additional information (e.g., thresholds) needs to be considered to compute the 
observed amount of interventions. In addition, at least six types of marginal effects can 
be computed in a friction model: one for the desired level of intervention, one for the 
observed level of intervention, two for the observed level of intervention conditional on 
                                                 
4   For more information see Maddala (1983). 





the sign of intervention (i.e., negative or positive, depending on sales or purchases of 
foreign exchange, respectively), and two for the probability of observing either a 
negative or positive intervention. These cases are discussed in detail in Appendix 2. 
3.2  Data sources and definition of the variables of interest 
Monthly data are used in the regressions. Information on central bank interventions, 
available from national sources, refers to the spot foreign exchange market. The data 
available from the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) are defined in USD millions (a 
positive sign implies a net purchase of foreign exchange). Information is also available 
for Brazil on interventions in derivatives markets (exchange rate swaps) defined as the 
monetary authority’s foreign exchange exposure (also in USD millions, a negative sign 
implies a net creditor position). For the Czech Republic, information readily available 
from the Czech National Bank (CNB) contains not only spot-market interventions but 
also other spot-market foreign exchange transactions, although operations related to the 
management of privatization proceeds are excluded. Information on pure interventions 
is confidential. The data are defined in EUR millions (a positive sign implies a net 
purchase of foreign exchange). 
The additional data are available predominantly from the CD-ROM version of the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). The exchange 
rate is the log of the end-of-period market rate expressed in local currency units per 
USD in the case of Brazil, and per EUR for the Czech Republic (series AE). We 
computed exchange rate deviations from fundamentals as the log difference between the 
exchange rate and its lagged value (short-term deviation), and as the log difference 
between the exchange rate and its 6-month moving average (medium-term deviation). 
To deal with potential simultaneity, these variables will enter the reaction function 
lagged one period. The interest rate is the discount rate (series ZF) for the Czech 
Republic and the overnight SELIC rate for Brazil (available from the BCB). The output 
gap was constructed as the difference between output (log of the seasonally-adjusted 
industrial production, series CZF) and its HP-filtered series. Inflation expectations are 
the one-period-ahead first-difference of the log of CPI (series XZF).5 The ratio of 
imports to international reserves is defined as the log difference between series DZF 
(cumulated over a 12-month period) and SZF (times 100).  
We follow Andersen et al. (2003) and use realized, rather than parametric estimates of 
volatility, such as those based on GARCH models. Realized volatility is computed as 
the sum of squared daily returns (available from DATASTREAM) within a month.6 The 
advantage of using realized volatility is that it is less noisy than measures based on 
GARCH modelling for the same frequency. As higher volatility may lead to both 
positive (purchases) or negative (sales) interventions, including it directly in the 
regression would weaken the statistical link between these two variables. To be able to 
                                                 
5.  Market survey inflation expectations started to be collected in July 2001 for Brazil and in June 1999 
for the Czech Republic. Using these series would have significantly shortened the estimation sample. 
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the number of working days in month t, and 
t
i e  is the end-of-day nominal exchange rate in day i of 
month t.  
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recover an interpretable coefficient, we opted for signing volatility positively for 
purchases and negatively for sales of foreign currency. For the days with no 
intervention, we followed Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) and signed volatility 
according to the sign of the deviation of the exchange rate from trend: volatility takes a 
positive sign if the deviation of the exchange rate from trend is negative (i.e., the 
domestic currency is overvalued) and a negative sign when the exchange rate deviation 
is positive (i.e.,  the domestic currency is undervalued).7 To deal with potential 
simultaneity, the variable enters the reaction function lagged one period. 
The time periods for the empirical analysis are country-specific and were selected on 
the basis of adoption of inflation targeting as the policy framework for the conduct of 
monetary policy. The sample spans the period 1999:7-2007:3 for Brazil and 1998:1-
2007:3 for the Czech Republic.8 
4  Monetary policy regimes in Brazil and the Czech Republic,  
and empirical studies 
Both Brazil and the Czech Republic conduct monetary policy within an inflation-
targeting framework and have intervened occasionally in the foreign exchange market 
since adoption of inflation targeting in 1998-99. Although Brazil has allowed the 
exchange rate to float freely since the peg was abandoned in January 1999, the Czech 
exchange rate regime can be characterized as a managed float. Intervention and 
monetary policies are under the purview of the central bank in both countries. Against 
this background, empirical studies for these countries have been mainly directed to 
assess the effectiveness of interventions in shaping exchange rate dynamics. 
4.1 Brazil 
Brazil formally adopted inflation targeting in July 1999. The central bank is allowed to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market to smooth excessive exchange rate volatility 
and build up international reserves. Interventions are sterilized through open-market 
operations. 
Over the period of analysis, the nominal exchange rate depreciated steadily after the 
abandonment of the peg in January 1999 until end-2002, despite short-lived periods of 
appreciation, and began to appreciate thereafter. A lack of confidence in the policies to 
be pursued by the frontrunner fuelled a speculative attack on the real in the run-up to 
the presidential election of October 2002, leading to a sharp depreciation during May-
                                                 
7  The Almekinders-Eijffinger strategy is based on the idea that the central bank may purchase (sell) 
foreign exchange to reduce volatility even when the exchange rate is perceived as already undervalued 
(overvalued). For more information see Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996). 
8   The sample excludes other emerging market inflation targeters, such as Chile, Colombia and Turkey, 
because interventions occurred only for limited periods of time in the case of Chile and Colombia and 
because of Turkey’s comparatively short experience with inflation targeting. Israel, Mexico, and 
Poland were not included in the analysis, because no interventions took place since the widening of 
the exchange rate band in Israel in 1997, and the abandonment of the exchange rate crawling peg in 
Poland in 2000. For Mexico, interventions consist of daily auctions of foreign currency and are 
considered a reserve management instrument.  
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4.2 Czech  Republic 
The Czech monetary policy framework combines inflation targeting (since January 
1998) with a managed exchange rate (since May 1997). A ‘formal commitment’ by the 
CNB to exchange rate management has been justified on the basis of the economy’s 
openness to trade and investment and the ensuing potential adverse effects of external 
shocks on the achievement of the inflation target. The reference currency for the koruna 
was the Deutschemark until 1999 and subsequently the euro. The CNB reserves the 
right to intervene in order to smooth ‘major deviations of the exchange rate that are not 
connected with domestic economic fundamentals and domestic monetary policy’ (CNB 
1998), although it does not target any central parity or fluctuation band. Interventions 
are sterilized through open-market operations.10  
The koruna appreciated steadily against the euro over the reference period, except for a 
short period at the beginning of 1999, and between mid-2002 and end-2003 (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 
Czech Republic: Exchange rate, interventions and monetary policy, 1998:1-2007:3 
 
A. Exchange rate and interventions

































































































































































































































































Source:   Czech National Bank. 
 
                                                 
10 Open market operations have been used extensively by the CNB since the first half of the 1990s to 
mop up the excess liquidity associated with the accumulation of foreign reserves. See Holub (2004) 
for an estimate of sterilization costs in the Czech case.  
11 
A sizable interest rate differential, especially during the early period of inflation 
targeting, as well as inflows of long-term capital linked to improved economic 
fundamentals and a comprehensive privatization programme after 2001 are the key 
drivers of the appreciating trend. Spot-market interventions were particularly large at 
the beginning of 1998, between end-1999 and early 2000, and during 2002, and 
consisted mainly of purchases of foreign currency to counter the appreciation of the 
koruna. The CNB has not intervened since 2003, despite a continued appreciation of the 
domestic currency since early 2004.11 Although no official statement was made on the 
reasons for the policy change, a lack of success of previous interventions and the quasi-
fiscal costs associated with sterilization operations are likely to have been the main 
culprits. To prevent monetary conditions from becoming overly restrictive, the CNB 
gradually relaxed the monetary stance during the period of analysis. 
4.3  The effectiveness of exchange rate interventions 
in Brazil and the Czech Republic 
There are very few studies on interventions in the case of Brazil. The existing literature 
focuses on the effect of spot-market interventions and the issuance of exchange rate 
derivatives (swaps) and dollar-denominated government securities on the level of the 
exchange rate. Novaes and Oliveira (2007) show that interventions are ineffective in 
periods of high exchange rate volatility, such as the transition period between the 
abandonment of the exchange rate peg and the adoption of inflation targeting in the first 
semester of 1999, and the run-up to the presidential election in the second semester of 
2002. In turn, when the foreign exchange market is calm, the level of the exchange rate 
seems to be affected more strongly by interventions (in both the spot and derivatives 
markets), than the stance of monetary policy. The estimation technique is GMM and 
daily data span the period January 1999-October 2006. 
As in the case of Brazil, the literature on foreign exchange interventions in the Czech 
Republic has focused on testing the effectiveness of such interventions using both event 
studies and GARCH estimations, rather than on the estimation of intervention reaction 
functions. By estimating a reaction function using instrumental variables and daily data 
for the period 2001-02, Disyatat and Galati (2007) find that interventions had a 
negligible impact on the spot rate and left volatility broadly unchanged. This finding is 
consistent with the evidence reported by Gersl and Holub (2006) on the basis of 
GARCH modelling. There also appears to be some asymmetry in interventions, which 
seem to have taken place predominantly to counter an appreciation of the koruna. 
Instead, the event study performed by Holub (2004) using monthly data lends some 
support to the success of intervention policies. On the basis of the event study and 
GARCH estimations reported by Egert and Komarek (2005) using daily data, 
interventions appear to have been effective in smoothing exchange rate volatility during 
from mid-1998 to 2002 when performed in coordination with monetary policy moves. 
                                                 
11 The CNB has also used off-market operations to convert the proceeds of privatizations into 
international reserves since 2002. These operations are considered more effective than monetary 
policy and spot-market interventions in countering appreciation of the koruna (CNB 2001), as well as 
being less costly to the CNB (Holub 2004).  
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5 The  results 
5.1  The determinants of intervention  
The results of the estimation of the intervention reaction functions for Brazil and the 
Czech Republic are reported in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.12 The regression results 
confirm the presence of threshold effects in the reaction functions, which lends strong 
support to the friction model specification. Both thresholds are statistically significant at 
classical levels, and one of them ( 1 Θ ) is higher in absolute value than the other ( 2 Θ ), 
suggesting that the central bank intervenes asymmetrically: it appears to react more 
strongly when aiming to depreciate than to appreciate the domestic currency.13 
For Brazil, interventions appear to depend strongly on exchange rate deviations from 
trend, at least over the medium term. A depreciation of the real relative to its six-month 
moving average triggers sales of foreign currency by the monetary authority, which 
characterizes leaning-against-the-wind interventions. The central bank does not appear  
 
Table 1 
The determinants of exchange rate interventions in Brazil
1 
(Dependent variable: Spot-market interventions, in USD billion) 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
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Likelihood function  -155.04  -155.03  -154.87 
Notes:  1)  The estimation period runs from July 1999 to March 2007. HAC robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectvely. 
  2)   The results of the estimation of the Taylor rule are reported in Appendix 3. 
Source:     Authors’ calculations based on data from the Central Bank of Brazil. 
                                                 
12 Unit root tests (not reported) were performed and variables were first differenced when needed. 




The determinants of exchange rate interventions in the Czech Republic1 
(Dependent variable: Spot-market interventions, in EUR billions) 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
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Likelihood function  -24.66  -21.85  -20.58 
Notes:  1)  The estimation period runs from January 1998 to March 2007. HAC robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectvely. 
  2)   The results of the estimation of the Taylor rule are reported in Appendix 3. 
Source:     Authors’ calculations based on data from the Central Bank of Brazil. 
 
to react to short-term exchange rate misalignments, at least as defined as changes in the 
nominal exchange rate from the previous month. The estimation results also show that 
the central bank reacts to exchange rate volatility, as hypothesized, to calm disorderly 
markets.14 These results are robust to different model specifications. Moreover, there 
does not appear to be a substitution effect between intervention operations in the spot 
market and in derivatives, given that the coefficient of the variable capturing the public 
sector’s exposure to exchange rate risk associated with the issuance of foreign exchange 
swaps is not statistically significant. Finally, the regression results are robust to the 
inclusion of the ratio of foreign reserves to imports to control for the fact the central 
bank has often stated that interventions have also aimed at accumulating international 
reserves as a means of reducing the country’s external vulnerabilities.  
As for the Czech Republic, there is no evidence of a response by the central bank to 
exchange rate misalignments, unlike the case of Brazil. But exchange rate volatility also 
triggers a strong response by the monetary authority. These findings are robust to 
different model specifications. The presence of threshold effects in the reaction function 
is also validated by the data, as well as the asymmetry in interventions, which appears to 
                                                 
14 A similar result was obtained in the case of Japan using an ordered probit methodology, where the 
authorities seem to be more prone to intervene following increases in exchange rate volatility (Bernal 
and Gnabo 2007).  
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be more prevalent when they are carried out to counter an appreciation of the domestic 
currency than a depreciation. In addition, unlike Brazil, there does not appear to be a 
statistically significant effect of changes in foreign reserves on interventions. 
5.3  Interdependencies between intervention and monetary policies 
With regard to the interdependencies between interventions and monetary 
policymaking, the regression results highlight important differences between the two 
countries in the sample. For neither country do the findings suggest that interventions 
carry strong signals about future moves in monetary policy. The one-period-ahead 
policy interest rate fails to attract a statistically significant coefficient in both countries. 
There is nevertheless evidence that the current monetary stance, gauged by the 
contemporaneous policy interest rate, is negatively correlated with interventions in the 
Czech Republic. Therefore, a tightening of monetary policy appears to complement 
spot-market interventions, suggesting that both policies are implemented in a 
coordinated manner. In the case of Brazil, no evidence was found to indicate that there 
might be contemporaneous interdependencies between interventions and the conduct of 
monetary policy. The contemporaneous policy interest rate is not statistically significant 
at classical levels.  
To test this hypothesis further, the contemporaneous interest rate was decomposed into 
its predicted value on the basis of the estimation of a Taylor rule-type monetary reaction 
function and the residuals of this reaction function. The regression results (reported in 
Appendix 3) show that the BCB raises interest rates in response to an increase in 
inflation expectations and the output gap. The lagged dependent variable is also strongly 
significant, suggesting some interest rate smoothing when setting monetary policy.15 
The CNB responds to changes in expected inflation, but not to the output gap. There is 
no evidence of interest smoothing in the CNB’s reaction function.  
The decomposition of the monetary stance between the fitted Taylor rule and its 
residuals confirms the finding that interventions are carried out independently of current 
monetary policy in Brazil. Neither the fitted interest rate nor the residuals of the Taylor 
rule affect interventions in a statistically significant manner. But this is not the case of 
the Czech Republic, where the residuals of the Taylor rule—measuring misalignments 
of the monetary stance in relation to its determinants—enter the intervention reaction 
function with a negative, statistically significant sign. This suggests that the CNB 
intervenes to purchase (sell) foreign exchange even when the monetary stance is looser 
(tighter) than predicted on the basis of the Taylor rule. This result confirms the previous 
finding that the central bank does try to coordinate intervention and monetary policies, 
by using spot exchange rate interventions and interest policy movements in a mutually 
reinforcing manner.  
5.4  The marginal effects 
Whereas the parameter estimates reported above capture the impact of changes in the 
explanatory variables on the desired level of intervention, the corresponding marginal 
                                                 
15 These findings are in line with those reported by Minella et al. (2003) and de Mello and Moccero 
(2006, 2007), among others.  
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effects allow for the analysis of the effects of the explanatory variables on the observed 
level of interventions. We computed the six marginal effects reported in Tables 4-5: 
Models (1)-(3) refer to specifications reported in Tables 1-2 for easy referencing. 
Column (1) reports the impact of changes in the explanatory variables on the desired 
level of intervention based on the parameter estimates reported in Tables 1-2;   
column (2) reports the impact of changes in the explanatory variables on the observed 
level of intervention; columns (3) and (4) refer to the same impact, conditional on the 
sign of intervention (i.e., purchases and sales of foreign currency); and, finally, columns 
(5) and (6) report the estimated impact of the explanatory variables on the probability, 
rather than the actual level, of intervention, conditional on the sign of intervention.16  
As interventions involve costs for the central bank, observed interventions may differ 
from desired interventions. The empirical evidence presented in columns (1) and (2) for 
both countries and for all models confirms that observed interventions are lower in 
magnitude than desired by the central banks. For example, in the case of Brazil, a one-
unit increase in exchange rate volatility is associated on average with purchases of 
foreign currency of almost USD20 million, while the desired level of intervention is 
about USD2  million higher. Also for Brazil, a one-percentage point appreciation 
(relative to the medium-term trend), is associated on average with purchases on foreign 
exchange in the order of USD123-125  million. Similar results are obtained for the 
Czech Republic. 
As implied by the size of the thresholds, the behaviour of the central bank may also 
depend on the sign of interventions. The results confirm the presence of asymmetries in 
the intervention reaction functions, as gauged by the higher absolute values of the 
marginal effects reported in column (4) with respect to those reported in column (3). As 
such, for equally-sized shocks affecting the explanatory variables, the monetary 
authorities react more strongly to counter appreciating trends than depreciations. For 
example, a one-unit increase in exchange rate volatility is associated with interventions 
of about USD7 million in Brazil and EUR6.7-7.5 millions in the Czech Republic, when 
the central bank intervenes in support of the domestic currency (i.e.,  it purchases 
domestic currency). By contrast, when the central bank intervenes to force a 
depreciation of the domestic currency (i.e.,  it sells domestic currency), the amounts 
increase to USD7.95-7.98  million and EUR8.4-9.2  millions, respectively. In other 
words, when the central bank is faced with heightened volatility in the foreign exchange 
market, interventions aimed at a depreciation of the domestic currency are about 25 per 
cent higher in magnitude in the Czech Republic (15 per cent higher in Brazil) than in the 
case of interventions in support of the domestic currency. In the same vein, interest rate 
changes in the Czech Republic are accompanied by stronger interventions when the 
central bank acts to support the local currency. These asymmetries are also present for 
the probability of interventions (columns 5-6).  
5.5 Robustness  checks 
The robustness of the estimations was assessed for different model specifications. We 
first re-estimated the reaction functions for both countries by replacing the ratio of 
                                                 
16 The marginal effects are evaluated at the respective means of the explanatory variables, conditional on 
the sign of intervention.  
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international reserves to imports by changes in reserve money (deflated by CPI 
inflation) to control for sterilization. The findings (not reported) are robust to this 
alternative specification. We also controlled for the possibility of a learning process in 
the intervention reaction function for the Czech Republic. As shown in Figure 3, the 
CNB was very active in 1998, the first year following the adoption of inflation 
targeting. The interest rate was sharply cut and numerous interventions were carried out. 
Therefore, this period can be considered as a transition period from different monetary 
policy regimes. We therefore re-estimated the model using a sample that starts in 
January 1999, rather than one year earlier. Again, this alternative specification did not 
affect our results, although there appears to be slightly stronger evidence in favour of 
the signalling hypothesis, as the one-period-ahead interest rate becomes significant at 
the 10 per cent level.  
Table 4 
Marginal effects: Brazil1 
(Dependent variable: Spot-market interventions, in USD millions) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Model (1) 
FX deviation from trend (short run)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
FX deviation from trend (medium run)  -123.00  -110.00  -38.50  -44.40  2.07  -2.14 
FX volatility  22.00  19.80  6.88  7.95  -0.37  0.38 
Interest rate (one period ahead)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
FX swaps  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Ratio of international reserves to imports  185.00  166.00  57.90  66.80  -3.12  3.22 
  Model (2) 
FX deviation from trend (short run)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
FX deviation from trend (medium run)  -125.00  -113.00  -39.30  -45.20  2.11  -2.17 
FX volatility  22.00  19.90  6.92  7.96  -0.37  0.38 
Interest rate (one period ahead)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Interest rate (contemporaneous)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
FX swaps  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Ratio of international reserves to imports  185.00  167.00  58.20  67.00  -3.13  3.22 
  Model (3) 
FX deviation from trend (short run)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
FX deviation from trend (medium run)  -123.00  -112.00  -39.10  -44.60  2.09  -2.14 
FX volatility  22.00  20.00  6.99  7.98  -0.37  0.38 
Interest rate (one period ahead)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Interest rate (fitted from Taylor rule)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Interest rate (residuals from Taylor rule)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
FX swaps  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Ratio of international reserves to imports  181.00  165.00  57.50  65.70  -3.07  3.15 
Note:   1)  The estimation period runs from July 1999 to March 2007. The marginal effects (for the 
explanatory variables that were found to be statistically significant) are evaluated at the 
respective means of explanatory variables, conditional on the sign of intervention. Columns 
(1) to (5) are measured in USD millions, while columns (5) and (6) report probability 
changes. 




Marginal effects: the Czech Republic1 
(Dependent variable: Spot-market interventions, in EUR millions) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Model (1) 
FX deviation from trend (short run)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
FX deviation from trend (medium run)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
FX volatility  25.00  22.00  7.45  9.19  -4.80  5.06 
Interest rate (one period ahead)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Ratio of international reserves to imports  –  –  –  –  –  – 
  Model (2) 
FX deviation from trend (short run)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
FX deviation from trend (medium run)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
FX volatility  22.00  20.30  6.71  8.43  -4.48  4.65 
Interest rate (one period ahead)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Interest rate (contemporaneous)  -11.00  -10.10  -3.36  -4.21  2.24  -2.33 
Ratio of international reserves to imports  –  –  –  –  –  – 
  Model (3) 
FX deviation from trend (short run)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
FX deviation from trend (medium run)             
FX volatility  23.00  21.20  7.00  8.82  -4.70  4.89 
Interest rate (one period ahead)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Interest rate (fitted from Taylor rule)  –  –  –  –  –  – 
Interest rate (residuals from Taylor rule)  -6.00  -5.52  -1.83  -2.30  1.23  -1.27 
Ratio of international reserves to imports  –  –  –  –  –  - 
Note:  1)  The estimation period runs from January 1998 to March 2007. The marginal effects (for the 
explanatory variables that were found to be statistically significant) are evaluated at the 
respective means of explanatory variables, conditional on the sign of intervention. Columns 
(1) to (5) are measured in EUR millions, while columns (5) and (6) measure probability 
changes. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Czech National Bank. 
6 Conclusions   
The literature on interventions under inflation targeting has neglected the potential 
interactions that may exist between monetary and exchange rate policies. To bridge this 
gap, this paper has focused on the experiences of Brazil and the Czech Republic, two 
countries that have adopted inflation targeting as the framework for the conduct of 
monetary policy, while occasionally intervening in the foreign exchange market. A 
friction model was used to estimate intervention reaction functions for both countries, 
including monetary variables among the regressors to capture these policy 
interdependencies. It was hypothesized that, if monetary and intervention policies are 
not interrelated, then the monetary variables should not affect the patterns of 
intervention at classical levels of statistical significance. We also contribute to the 
empirical literature by computing the marginal effects associated with the intervention 
reaction function estimated using a friction model to capture potential asymmetries in 
the impact of different variables on interventions.  
18 
Our findings show that the main reason why the central bank intervenes in the spot 
foreign exchange market in both Brazil and the Czech Republic appears is to calm 
disorderly markets, rather than to target a specific level of the exchange rate. 
Interventions were found to be strongly affected by exchange rate volatility in both 
countries, and by exchange rate deviations from medium-term trends in Brazil. 
Moreover, there appears to be strong, asymmetric threshold effects in the intervention 
reaction function in both countries. The monetary authorities in these countries have 
intervened predominantly to force a depreciation of the domestic currency, rather than 
to prop up its value. Finally, interventions seem to take place independently of 
contemporaneous monetary policy in Brazil, but not in the Czech Republic, where both 
policies appear to be coordinated.  
  
 











Ito and Yabu 
(2007) 
Sample period  1987-89  1985-91, 1985-95  1977-94  1995-90  1991-2001  1991-2002 
Central banks (CBs)  Bundesbank, Fed  Fed, Bundesbank, BoJ  Fed, Bundesbank, BoJ  Fed, Bundesbank, BoJ  BoJ  BoJ 
Theoretical model   Yes: Central bank loss 
function 
No  No  No  No  Yes: Central bank loss 
function 
 
Econometric model  Friction model  Probit model  Probit model  Two Probit models (one for 
sales and one for purchases) 
GMM Ordered  Probit  model 
 
Motivation for the 
econometric model 
Abstaining (band for no 
action). No intervention is 
viewed as an investment in 
the potential effects of future 
interventions 
— —  —  —  Abstaining (band for no 
action). There is ‘political cost’ 
to implement a decision to 
intervene. 
 
Dependent variable  The amount of intervention  Dummy variable  
(1 for intervention 
and 0 otherwise) 
Dummy variable  
(1 for intervention 
and 0 otherwise) 
Dummy variable  
(1 for intervention 
and 0 otherwise) 
The amount of 
intervention 
Three discrete values (1 for 
the purchase of domestic 
currency, -1 for the sale of 
domestic currency and 0 
otherwise) 
Explanatory variables             
• Exchange rate level
(St is the log of ex-
change rate in time t) 
St – ST |St – St-1|  |St-1 – ST|  St – ST  St-1 – St-2’ 
St-1 – St-21’ 
St-1– St-T 
St-1 – St-2’ 
St-1 – St-21’ 
St-1– St-T 
 
• Exchange rate target ST is a moving average of  
the exchange rate over  
past 7 days 
—  ST is a moving average 
of the exchange rate  
over the past 10 days 
ST is the Funabashi 125 
JPY/USD value 
ST is the Funabashi 125 
JPY/USD value 
ST is a moving average of 
the exchange rate over the 
previous year 
 
• Exchange rate 
volatility (σ is a 
measure of volatility) 
σt  
from a daily GARCH 
 
σt-1  
from a daily FIGARCH 
σt-1 – σT  
with σt-1 from a daily 
GARCH (T is moving 
average over 10 days)  
or implied volatility  
from options 
σt-1 – σ 
with σt-1 from a daily GARCH 
No No 
Lagged intervention   No  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
 
Main results  CBs react to: 
• FX deviations  
• Volatility 
CBs react to: 
• FX deviations  
Interventions are 
clustered over time  
and do not react to: 
• Volatility 
CBs do not react to: 
• FX deviations  
• Volatility 
CBs react to: 
• FX deviations  
• Volatility 
These results are sensitive to 
the sign of the operation and 
the nature of the currency. 
CBs react to: 
• FX deviations  
Interventions are 
clustered over time 
CBs react to: 
• FX deviations  




















Computing marginal effects for the friction model 
On the basis of Equation (2), the effect of changes in Xt on It can be computed from 
different expectation functions. Once the β ’s have been estimated, we can compute the 
effects on the latent variables directly through Equation (10) below. There are, in 
addition, three other predictions that can be made on the observed amount of 
interventions, It, conditional on the occurrence or not of interventions. These predictions 
are given by: 
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Equation (3) can be re-written as:  












=Φ + + −Φ − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ Φ− Φ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
.   (9) 
Equation (3) refers to the expectations unconditional on the occurrence of interventions, 
whereas Equations (4-6) refer to the conditional expectations. The expressions 
*
2 | EII ⎡⎤ >Θ ⎣⎦  and 
*
1 | EII ⎡⎤ <Θ ⎣⎦  provide the means of (observed) positive and negative 
interventions. E[I] is the mean of all observed interventions (positive and negative). 
Finally,  ()
*
2 PI>Θ  and  ()
*
1 PI<Θ  are the probabilities that an intervention will take 
place.  
The following derivatives can be computed to predict the effects of changes in the 
exogenous variables using the four expectation functions in Equations (3)-(6) and the 
two probabilities in Equations (7)-(8). Denote by βj the j-th component of β. Dropping  
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subscript t, which refers to the t-th observation, for convenience, yields the marginal 
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The marginal effects on the observed level of intervention are computed as: 
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The marginal effects on the observed level of intervention when the central bank 
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Finally, the marginal effects on the observed level of intervention when the central bank 
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The marginal effects on the probability of intervening (selling or purchasing foreign 
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Appendix 3 
Estimation of a Taylor-type monetary policy reaction function for Brazil 
and the Czech Republic 
The Taylor rule is estimated as:  t t
e
t t t y r r ] )[ 1 ( 1 γ βπ α ρ ρ + + − + = − , where rt is the policy 
interest rate at time t, 
e
t π  is expected inflation, measured as the one-period-ahead actual 
inflation, and yt is the output gap. Data sources and the definition of the variables are 
reported in the main text. 
 Table 6 
The determinants of monetary policy in Brazil and the Czech Republic
 
(Dependent variable: the policy interest rate) 
  Brazil  Czech Republic 
  (1999:7 to 2007:2)  (1998:1 to 2007:2) 
















Likelihood function  -188.57  -341.40 
Note:   1)  The models are estimated by full information maximum likelihood. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. (***), (**), and (*) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
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